

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A SPILLOVER OF DOMESTIC DISPUTES IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Tony Addison
UNU/WIDER
Katajanokanlaituri 6B
FIN-00160, Helsinki, Finland
Addison@wider.unu.edu

&

S. Mansoob Murshed*
Institute of Social studies (ISS)
PO Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
Netherlands
Murshed@iss.nl

This version: September 16th 2002

ABSTRACT

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor raises overall levels of violence.

Keywords: Conflict, Terrorism, Civil War

JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D81, H11, O19.

* Corresponding author.